

Contents

1	Introduction: Is Contemporary International Environmental Law Based on Science?	1
1.1	Arbitrary Adoption of Laws Before the Eyes of an Environmentalist	6
1.2	Case Study: The Regulations of the International Seabed Authority	6
1.3	Definitions of the Main Terms-of-Art	9
1.3.1	Composition of and Role Distinction Between Political and Expert Bodies	9
1.3.2	Experts as Natural and Social Scientists	11
1.3.3	Science-Based Policy Making, Science-Based Decision-Making and Science-Based Lawmaking	15
1.4	First Attempt to Define Science-Based Lawmaking	21
2	Historical Background: What Are the Lessons Learnt from the Past and What Remains To Be Answered	23
2.1	From Plato’s Philosopher-King to Enlightenment, Noocracy, Expert Technocracy and Eco-technocracy	23
2.2	Milestone Instruments Calling for Effective Integration of Science in International Environmental Law	35
2.2.1	Early Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Conventions	37
2.2.2	Acknowledgment of the Importance of Science in Treaty-Making	41
2.2.3	The Road to Stockholm	47
2.2.4	The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment	49
2.2.5	The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development	56

2.2.6	The State of International Environmental Law at the 2002 UN World Conference on Sustainable Development	60
2.2.7	Deployment of New Environmental Tools: Risk Assessments and Environmental Impact Assessments	64

Part I Pathology of International Environmental Law

3	Fragmentation of Science, International Environmental Law, and International Institutions	75
3.1	The Principle of Specialization in International Institutions . . .	78
3.2	The Need for an Ecosystems Approach and an Integrated Approach	79
3.3	Integrated Approach and Institutional Cooperation	81
3.4	Delays in International Responses to New Environmental Problems Such as Climate Change	83
3.5	Impotence to Design Large-Scale Scientific Models	86
3.6	Efforts for the Promulgation of a Coherent Set of General Principles of International Environmental Law	88
3.6.1	Montevideo Program	88
3.6.2	The Case of the United Nations Forum on Forests . . .	90
4	Causes of Pathology	93
4.1	Vagueness of the Provisions in International Environmental Law	93
4.2	Legislative Inaction in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty	99
4.2.1	Chaos Theory and Certainty	99
4.3	Questioning Science	103
4.4	Green Critiques on the Power Structure of Science	105
4.5	Ecologic Illiteracy	108
4.6	Why Is It Now the Right Time for a Science-Based Lawmaking Model?	108
4.7	Acquisition of Lawmaking Competences by International Organizations	112
4.8	Integration of Science and Expertise in the Pyramid of International Environmental Law	114
4.9	The Principles of Sustainability as a First Overall Framework for the Adoption of Secondary Legislation	116
4.10	Second Attempt to Define Science-Based Lawmaking	117

Part II Normative Powers of the International Institutions with Environmental Competence

5	Contemporary Lawmaking Processes and Progressive Lawmaking Processes That Bind the States Without Unanimous Vote	121
5.1	Theoretical Framework of the Lawmaking Competences of the International Institutions	121
5.1.1	From Functionalism to Neoinstitutionalism	124

5.2	Do International Institutions Make Law?	127
5.2.1	Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justices and the Sources of Public International Law	128
6	Progressive Lawmaking Procedures in the Framework of International Institutions with Environmental Competence	133
6.1	Evolution of the Voting Procedures and Their Influence on the Normative Powers of the International Institutions	135
6.1.1	The Traditional Rule of Unanimity	135
6.1.2	The Departure from Unanimity and Forms of Consensus	136
6.1.3	Beyond Consensus: Stepping into the Realm of Legislation	139
6.1.4	Three-Quarters or Three-Fourths Majority	144
6.1.5	Two-Thirds Majority	147
6.1.6	Simple Majority	153
6.2	Quasi-Legislative Competences: The Opting-Out Procedure	154
6.2.1	“Tacit Acceptance” Under the International Maritime Organization	164
6.2.2	International Legislation “Par Excellence”	170
6.2.3	Lawmaking Processes in Cases of Urgency	173
6.2.4	Provisional Effect of Rules	182
6.3	Processes for the Generation of Soft Law Regarding Environmental Protection	185
6.4	Third Attempt to Define Science-Based Lawmaking	189
7	Normative Powers of Expert Bodies as Variables for Effective Environmental Governance	191
7.1	Typology of Expert Bodies in International Institutions	193
7.2	Differentiated Roles of the Expert Bodies in the Lawmaking Process	196
7.2.1	Participation of Expert Bodies in the Preparatory Stage of the International Environmental Law	196
7.2.2	Expert Bodies with Competencies for Information and Advice	202
7.2.3	Expert Bodies with Competence for Review, Assessment and Updating	226
7.2.4	Expert Bodies with Competences Regarding the Review of Implementation	244
7.2.5	Expert Bodies with Competence in Review of Compliance	252
7.2.6	Expert Bodies in Dispute Settlement and Institutional Interpretation	260
7.2.7	Participation of Expert Bodies of International Institutions in Dispute Settlement and Judicial Interpretation	265

8	Additional Theoretical Legal Bases for the Integration of Science in International Environmental Law Without Any Constitutional or Procedural Amendment	269
8.1	Implied Powers	270
8.2	“Action Required to Achieve the Purpose of the Agreement”	275
8.3	Indirect Legislation by Reference	277
8.4	Interpretation Under the Lenses of Intertemporal Law	277
8.5	Customary Institutional Law	278
8.6	Forth Attempt to Define Science-Based Lawmaking	279
Part III	Democratic Governance and Public Accountability as Limitations to the Science-Based Lawmaking Model	
9	The Inherent Limits of the Science-Based Lawmaking Model	283
9.1	Ethos and Deep Environmentalism Countervail Science	287
9.2	The Case of Commercial Whaling	288
9.3	The EC Hormones Case	294
10	Criticism Against the Delegation of Lawmaking Powers to Experts Based Upon Democratic Considerations	299
10.1	Experts Are Not Elected Representatives by the People	300
10.2	Dependency of Experts as Further Counterargument to Delegation of Lawmaking Competences	300
10.3	Arguments for Science-Based Lawmaking in Parallel with Democratic Lawmaking	302
10.3.1	Participation of Scientists at the International Lawmaking Processes Enhances the Democratic Rule	302
10.3.2	Risk Perception, Public Choice and Defects of Democracy in Environmental Lawmaking	306
10.3.3	Empowering Civil Society and Addressing the Inequality of Weapons	312
10.3.4	Revision of the Notion of Law as a Purely Social Enterprise: Nature as an Indispensable Actor in International Environmental Law	314
10.3.5	Distortion of Science and the Corrective Rule for the Support of Democracy	316
10.3.6	A Science-Based Lawmaking Model Supported by Radical Democratic Concepts	317
10.4	Fifth Attempt to Define Science-Based Lawmaking	319
Part IV	“To Unite the Political Power with the Wisdom . . .”: The Decision-Making Model That Accepts Expertise as a Basis of Legitimacy	
11	Why Would States Obey Rules Issued by Expert Bodies?	323
11.1	Reasons for State Obedience to Public International Law	323
11.2	Building the Science-Based Lawmaking Paradigm	330

12	Science Expertise as a Legitimacy Basis for Lawmaking and Additional Bases of Legitimacy	333
12.1	In the Quest for Effectiveness	333
12.1.1	Delegation of Powers and Democratic Control Within the European Union	334
12.1.2	Participation of the Commission as an Expert Organ at the Lawmaking Process of the European Union	335
12.1.3	The Previous Committee System of the European Union (Comitology)	339
12.1.4	Criticism to the Committee Procedure	341
12.1.5	The Comitology Procedure After the Lisbon Treaty	342
12.1.6	Independent Regulatory Agencies of the European Union	343
12.2	Visions of Legitimacy of the Lawmaking Process in International Environmental Law	345
13	A New <i>Modus Operandi</i> for the International Institutions with Environmental Competence	353
13.1	Rousseauian, Democratic Legitimacy: Representativeness and Accountability	354
13.1.1	Forms of Accountability	354
13.2	Weberian, Expertise-Based Legitimacy: Rationality, Efficacy, Efficiency and Neutrality	360
13.2.1	Appointment of Independent Experts	361
13.2.2	The Right of Initiative	364
13.2.3	Review of Implementation and Compliance and the Openness Question	366
13.2.4	Legislation by Expert Bodies Followed by the Right of the States to Opt-out	368
13.2.5	The Time Dimension	369
13.2.6	Remedies Against Regulatory Inaction (Failure to Act)	370
13.3	Madisonian, Systemic Legitimacy: Power Sharing, Legality, and Fairness	371
13.4	Habermasian, Procedural Legitimacy: Deliberation, Transparency, Participation and Due Process	373
13.4.1	Transparency	373
13.4.2	Participation and Openness of the Meetings	374
13.4.3	The Right to Know as a Human Right	374
13.4.4	Due Process	376

Part V Towards a Comprehensive Science-Based Lawmaking Model	
14 Conclusion	381
Appendix: Main Functions and Features of Expert Bodies	385
Selected Bibliography	387