In a sense, this book suggests a redefinition of the term ‘crime’. Currently, ‘crime’ denotes a violation of criminal law provisions. This book claims that ‘crime’ should be understood as the violation of the human rights of an individual (or of individuals) and that the responses to criminal offences should reflect this understanding. To give an example, if a person threatens another with a gun demanding that she hand over her money, this would commonly be seen as a violation of a criminal code’s legal provision prohibiting armed robbery. However, it is suggested here that this incident should primarily be interpreted as a violation of an individual’s rights not to be threatened with violence and to the respect of her property, as well as a behaviour that is disrespectful to this individual as a person. Hence, what this book maintains is that the crime of armed robbery should not be reduced to the violation of a (nation) state’s laws, but should appreciate what it means to the victim as a person and member of the human family—the violation of her dignity and rights. Based on a sketch of a human-rights based criminal justice system previously published by the author (2003), this book makes an effort to elaborate this redefinition of ‘crime’—as a rights violation beyond a law violation—because unless ‘crime’ is defined in a manner relating it to the rights and personhood of an individual (or individuals), courts will fail to deliver justice to victims, and the rights of victims will not fully materialise. Only once we acknowledge what the criminal offence means to the victim as a person holding rights and that the victim, for what the offence means to her, is entitled to the solidarity of her legal community, will rights of victims become a significant part of the everyday reality of criminal justice in Europe.