papers that deal with various broad and more specific issues of enforcement. Apart from the presentation of the new (2013) OECD indicators of Competition Law and Policy with evidence about how Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa perform relatively to OECD countries, these issues include those of institutional design, the incorporation of public interest concerns in Competition Authority objectives, procedural fairness, procurement procedures, and compulsory licensing. The second category of papers focuses on a distinct theme and this concerns developments in the application of economic analysis and evidence in Competition Law enforcement in the BRICS. Economic analysis is thought to improve the overall welfare effects of Competition Law enforcement by reducing the decision errors of the agencies and by improving the deterrence effects on welfare of the enforcement procedures. It has been extensively applied for many years in competition law enforcement in the developed economies in order to provide analytical tools and models for understanding cartel behaviour, types of monopolisation, the impact of vertical and horizontal mergers, as well as playing, more recently, an increasingly important role in the assessment of legal standards and the shaping of tools of enforcement, such as leniency programmes, detection, determination of fines and settlements, and alternative sanctions. The importance of the role of economic evidence and of relying on the predictions of sound economic analysis in competition law enforcement has been stressed by international organisation such as the OECD not just in the context of developed countries but equally and perhaps more importantly in developing ones.