This volume is the result of a very special international conference in legal philosophy on the relationship between legal theory and evaluative judgments that took place in Girona in May 2010. “Can legal theory be neutral?” was our leading question. Within the narrow scope of a preface, we cannot dwell into the subject matter of the book. But we would like to account for the context in which both this volume and its preceding conference were conceived. In 2004, the Spanish publishing house Marcial Pons issued the fi rst books of the “Filosof?a y Derecho” (“Philosophy and Law”) series. The project was originally a relatively modest one. At the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century, publishers fi nd themselves in an impasse of sorts, between printed and digital editions, local and global scopes, commercial and cultural drives—the fi rst element of each pair still the dominating one—and a series of philosophical books did not exactly look like a promising venture. Yet in 2008, only 4 years later, around 40 volumes of the collection could be found on the shelves of bookshops. With the invaluable support of Juan José Pons, Marcial’s son, we began to kindle the idea of organizing an international conference to mark the 50th volume in our series—a conference bringing together Continental and Anglo-American analytic philosophers on some common jurisprudential subject. Because such a combination was already part of the identity of the book series, we decided to invite some of its authors as speakers. They all immediately agreed to participate.