An attractively Rawlsian account of justice and the normative grounds of law across our planet should be cosmopolitan in its motivation and foundations; it should be understood as consonant with the rejection of the Westphalian state and as providing a framework within which that rejection might be justified. While it would differ from Rawls’s own account of global justice, it could qualify as Rawlsian because it would seek to extend Rawls’s understanding of domestic justice, suitably modified, to the global level and because it could be grounded in a Rawlsian account of the justification of societal institutions. Rawls’s The Law of Peoples articulates a set of proposed norms for global justice, international law, and the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal state (or, as Rawls prefers, “people”). These norms are grounded in an original position (or, more precisely, two parallel original positions) structurally similar to the one he famously employs in framing principles of domestic justice. But the deliberators at the global level are understood to represent peoples rather than individuals. Rawls envisions the Law of Peoples these deliberators would endorse as acceptable to both liberals and those he calls “decent” nonliberals (Chapter 1). Rawls’s defense of his decision to treat peoples rather than persons as foundational at the global level is surprisingly thin (Chapter 2). There are multiple rationales Rawls might have offered or that other Rawlsians might offer for this decision to opt for a people- based rather than a cosmopolitan starting point.