Being considered an art should be viewed as a compliment for any science, but it is (usually) not. This is particularly true in the case of psychology, which was first a casualty in the “science wars” in nineteenth-century Europe (Valsiner, 2012), followed by the skirmishes between emerging psychologists and hardline philosophers about the “dangers of psychologism” (Kusch, 1995) at the turn of the twentieth century. What followed over the next century were two World Wars; the exodus of psychology as a science from Europe to North America; and the establishment of psychology as “an empirical science.” In that transition, it took on new social organizational forms from US society, which had embraced the arrival of this refugee science—the notion of “majority” (“mainstream” psychology) versus “minority” (various “nonmainstream” trends) . To speak about “mainstream” psychology in the year 1900 would have made no sense. Even if Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig drew hordes of international visitors, who carried its handicrafts of laboratory plans and design of experimental equipment all over the world, that laboratory was in no way the “mainstream” of psychology in Germany. One hundred years later, in 2000 and beyond, we are well-versed in referencing “mainstream psychology”— usually to contrast what we do ourselves positively against its dull intellectual modus operandi.