Legal interpretation was a matter of great controversy in 19th century Germany. The conflicts that took place between the historical school and what was deemed the school of Begriffsjurisprudenz is well known. This debate increasingly broadened divisions between the Germanisten and the Romanisten, and Savigny, Puchta, Jhering are just some of the names that come to mind as the major actors at play. The issue of legal interpretation has continued to be discussed in the 20th century; a great part of the works of Zitelmann, Ehrlich, Gény, Kelsen, Holmes, Cardozo, Llewellyn, Hart and, more recently, of Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and Neil MacCormick have been devoted to pressing interpretive questions. These questions include those concerning the issues of “judge-made law,” silences in the law, the idea of “one right answer”, the Janus-faced character of legal interpretation, and the nature of legal reasoning itself. In addition, the “linguistic turn,” influenced by the views of L. Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and H.-G. Gadamer, among others, accentuated this focus on the role of interpretation in the creation of legal norms.