Public choice and law and economics were distinct revolutions in economic thought, expanding the economic method of homo economicus into areas traditionally reserved for other disciplines. Both developments took place at approximately the same time (the 1950s and 1960s), and many of the same scholars participated in laying the theoretical foundations in both public choice and law and economics. A partial listing in no particular order would include Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Gary Becker, Richard Posner, George Stigler, Henry Manne, Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, and still others. Over time, as these new subdisciplines found acceptance as “normal science,” the two areas of research evolved into courses and research programs that were and largely remain independent of one another. Recognizing that I am painting with a broad brush, the law and economics subdiscipline grew into a largely normative enterprise of evaluating legal rules and institutions relative to some normative standard such as economic efficiency. One branch of public choice produced what sometimes seemed like never-ending and highly complicated analyses of voting rules and other political institutions. But a second tradition of positive public choice also emerged, in which economic methods were applied to politics and political decision-making in order to understand how government worked as opposed to how it “ought” to work. In the positive economic approach, government is not decried as being “inefficient” in some sense, but rather is seen as a purposeful enterprise organized, staffed, and run by the children of Adam Smith and Bernard Mandeville.