For several decades, one of the leading perspectives in legal theory—perhaps the leading perspective—has been the economic analysis of law. The theory of human behavior underlying standard economic analysis of law, like economic analysis in general, has been the rational choice theory. According to this theory, people strive to enhance their own well-being, choosing the available option that would maximize their expected utility. In the past two decades or so, hand in hand with comparable developments in economics, the economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies attesting to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. These studies have challenged the assumption of thin, cognitive rationality by showing that people’s preferences often do not comply with the rules of dominance, transitivity, and invariance. These studies also called into question the assumption of thick, motivational rationality by pointing to the role of motivations such as envy and altruism. From a slightly different angle, experimental and empirical studies have shown that people’s moral judgments do not fall in line with the consequentialist underpinnings of welfare economics, the normative branch of economic analysis, but are much more aligned with deontological morality.