The relationships between knowledge, technologies, and legal processes are central to the constitution of contemporary societies. As such, they have come to be the focus for a range of academic projects, across interdisciplinary legal studies and the social sciences. Legal scholars are commonly drawn to exploring the legal developments that respond to or are shaped by scientific innovation. The domains of medical law and ethics, intellectual property law, environmental law and criminal law are just some of those within which the pervasive place and ‘impact’ of technoscience is immediately apparent. At the same time, social scientists investigating the making of technology and expertise – in particular, scholars working within the tradition of science and technology studies (STS) – frequently interrogate how regulation and legal processes, and the making of knowledge and technologies, are intermingled in complex ways that come to shape and define each other. The interrogation of ‘law’, ‘science’, and ‘technology’ has also worked to render problematic any notion that these are tightly bounded things always already out there in the world, waiting patiently for analytic attention. We might, perhaps, broadly agree on what law and technoscience look like, but seeking to provide minute and enduring definitions only further pluralizes their ontologies. Accordingly, we are sceptical about the possibility of definitively specifiying the natures of knowledge, technologies, and legal processes – even as we necessarily hold on to imaginaries of each of these in order to work and to live.