Writing an introduction to a book consisting of a collection of papers most often takes one of two forms; namely, a description of the characteristics of the content of the book indicating the problems elaborated in subsequent chapters or a statement of the problem that the book is dedicated to. We decided to combine both forms for this book – Towards Recognition of Minority Groups: Legal and Communication Strategies – in order to introduce the reasons for the division of the book and the problems investigated in each chapter. The idea of human dignity is undoubtedly associated with the concept of lawgiving will that can be traced to Rousseau’s Social Contract, wherein any kind of slavery presumes the nonrecognition of human freedom and thus a refusal to acknowledge moral autonomy and therefore humanity. For Rousseau, the fundamental objective of the social contract is thus to establish a polity that protects and guarantees the moral autonomy of each as free and equal to any other member of the polity. In the Kantian approach, which develops Rousseau’s idea in more liberal terms, this autonomous will leads to a construction of procedures of juridification, moral as well as legal, of intersubjective relationships within the polity. Such a polity requires the establishment of further relations among other polities in the positive terms of international relations in accordance with the civitas gentium.1 This problem of the interrelationship between moral and legal will persisted until the linguistic turn in the second half of the twentieth century and undertaken on this basis, discourse ethics, which highlighted the interrelationships between moral and legal discourse.2 According to Habermas, the autonomous will operates in the public spheres and differentiates the issues to be publicly solved in strong publics (political will-formation) or decided in lifeworlds (wild circles), or cooperatively debated and elaborated in weak publics (opinion-formation). The autonomous will ‘exists’ in the communicative structures, where it does justice to the Kantian concept of lawgiving will by setting a discursively legitimised normative framework for all those strata. It follows that discursively justified actions may be undertaken based on common values and goals if and as long as the said values and/or goals do not take precedence over the legitimate normative framework. Hence, discursive actions operate against the backdrop of communicative actions understood in more general terms because ‘autonomy is relational, intersubjective entity, not a monological achievement.