Since Pericles and Ephialtes in 462 BC carried through the Athenian Assembly an act formally depriving the Areopagus – the ancient court of the Archons – of much of their jurisdiction and political influence, the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature has been near the heart of constitutional government in democracies. What are the proper limits on judicial power and how far may the judiciary call the legislature to account? This book with its study of the judicial review of legislation in three jurisdictions shines a light into that heart. The three jurisdictions studied are well chosen. On the one hand, there is the United Kingdom with its sovereign Parliament that admits no challenge to its authority. So, in principle, in the UK there can be no judicial review of legislation (apart from subordinate legislation made under delegated powers). But there is also the Human Rights Act 1998 which does not allow the courts to quash legislation but does allow the court to scrutinise legislation for compliance with fundamental rights and to declare any incompatibility found leaving it to the elected authorities to remedy the position. There is also the possibility in the UK that the courts will take the bold step and assert a power to review legislation in appropriate circumstances. But this possibility, while supported by some scholars and the occasional obiter dictum, finds no echo from the elected representatives of the people. The attempted exercise of such a power would be very controversial and the political consequences impossible to predict.