Although by the middle of the twentieth century most Western democracies had written constitutions and many of them included a bill of rights, the power to determine the content of these rights belonged to the elected legislature. Since then this power has been transferred in most countries to courts. As Ran Hirschl says, ‘Around the globe, in numerous countries and in several supranational entities, fundamental constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judiciaries.’1 This institutional transition has been accompanied by an intellectual change: today most legal scholars wholeheartedly embrace the aforementioned transfer of power. Although there has always been a couple of constitutional theorists who criticized the judicialization of politics, and some of them put forward sophisticated arguments, their works have had little effect on the general intellectual climate. In many places of the world the belief that majoritarian democracy has to give way to a more enlightened model of government has become so ingrained that conferring sweeping powers on constitutional courts no longer requires justification. The legitimacy of constitutional review, to use John Stuart Mill’s words, is ‘not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed’, and, therefore, the belief in the justifiability of constitutional review is held ‘as a dead dogma, not a living truth’.